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Austin, Texas 
SYNOPSIS 
R. E. Heuer 
Geotechnical Consultant, McHenry, Illinois 
A circular excavation, 117 feet (36 m) in diameter by 90 feet (27 m) deep, was designed by an experienced engineering finn 
and construction was performed by an experienced contractor. Nevertheless, the excavation support system suffered a 
complete collapse long before the maximum depth was reached. The failure is described and its causes are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
A buried tank, with an inside diameter of 105 feet (32m), 
a wall thickness of 4 feet (1.2 m), and a depth to its bottom 
of 88 feet (27 m), was designed for a new sewage treatment 
plant at a site in Central Texas. The designer made a single 
soil boring at the center of the excavation and found that 
there was about 34 feet (10m) of cohesive soil overlying a 
clay shale. A well known engineering firm, with wide 
international experience, designed a support system 
consisting of steel ring beams with vertical timber lagging. 
When the excavation reached a depth of about 42 feet (13 
m) (Fig. 1), the support system collapsed and was a total 
loss. 
In the resulting litigation, there was an opportunity to 
consider the design assumptions and the construction 
method, and to participate with experts in several fields in 
an effort to determine the cause(s) of the collapse. As usual 
in such cases, the various parties disagreed as to matters of 
fact as well as matters involving interpretation. Relevant 
parts of these considerations are reviewed in this manuscript 
and conclusions drawn regarding the causes of the failure. 
SITE CONDITIONS 
The site is flat and located in the flood plain of a river. 
The single soil boring specified by the design engineer, 
located at the center of the shaft, indicated the profile shown 
in Table 1. The soil boring was made during a dry period 
in the summer and no water table was encountered. The 
closest additional boring was 450 feet (137m) away. That 
boring, and others at a greater distance, showed the 
presence of 19 to 35 feet (6-11 m) of cohesive soil over 7 to 
12 feet (2-4 m) of sand and gravel. The designer estimated 
that the sand and gravel layer terminated about 200 feet (60 
m) away from the edge of this shaft and thus estimated that 
there would be only minor seepage of water into the 
c--- concrete 
ring beam 
--- cohesive soil 
tie rods used as hangers 
(one shown as an example) 
...__ __ mixed clay, silt, 
sand, and gravel 
clay shale 
excavation depth at the 
time of failure (42' deep, 
13m) 
Fig. 1 Cross Section Through the West Side of the 
Excavation at the Time it Failed 
excavation. To be on the safe side, the designer assumed the 
possible presence of 3 feet (1 m) of relatively cohesionless 
soil just above the claystone. 
DESIGN 
The designers considered the site an obvious one for use of 
ring beams and timber lagging but indicated that liner plates 
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0-12 SILTY CLAY, dark brown to brown, 
(0-4) calcareous, organic material at top, sandy at 
bottom 
12-34 SANDY SILTY CLAY, tan to rusty tan, 
(4-10) brown, orange brown, calcareous, frequent 
shell fragments, some gravel and iron 
staining at the bottom 
34-41 CHALKY CLAYSTONE, tan and light gray, 
(10-12.5) weathered, occasional fossils and pyrite, 
upper few feet are fractured 
>41 CHALKY CLAYSTONE, mostly gray, 
(>12.5) slickensided and fractured 
might be needed occasionally. The cohesive soils should 
stand unsupported for reasonable periods of time to allow 
placement of the supports. The lagging would provide 
needed local support for the fractured claystone. 
A post-failure deposition by one of the design engineers 
led to the inference that the designer had not given serious 
consideration to any other support system in the overlying 
soils but had considered a variety of support systems in the 
underlying fissured claystone. In the deposition, the 
engineer claimed that steel sheeting could not be driven at 
this site, and that most other types of support would be 
uneconomical. 
No original design computations could be obtained for 
the steel ring beams. The pre-bid geotechnical report 
mentioned need for only "nominal support" in the overlying 
soils. Testimony from one structural engineer was that the 
designer considered the beams to be in pure compression 
and did not consider the possibility of buckling failure. 
Design drawings contained the design pressure distribution 
labeled "Pressure used in Design" in Fig. 2. To resist those 
pressures, the designers recommended use of steel ring 
beams and vertical wood lagging (Table 2), assuming that 
the claystone would be encountered at a depth of about 34 
feet (10 m). The designer's pressure diagram has been 
extended to the actual excavation depth of about 42 feet (13 
m) in Fig. 2. 
Ring beam spacing was 4ft (1.2 m), except that rings 2 
and 3 were 5 ft (1.5 m) apart. 
The ring beams were tied to beams above and below 
using one-inch (25 mm) diameter steel tie rods spaced every 
six feet (1.8 m) around the circumference of the excavation. 
Each tie rod was connected to the two adjacent ring beams. 
The tie rods between ring 1 and 2 were encased in pipe so 
ring 1 could be supported on ring 2, whereas other tie rods 
were only in tension and had no pipe covers. 
Square frame blackouts in the ring beam system were 
present at several locations around the shaft, extending from 
rings 4 through 6. One was located at the top of the initial 
failure area. Ring 5 was not continuous across this area. 
800 
Horizontal Pressure (kPa) 
0 50 100 150 
0~------,-------------~------------~o 
so~~_.--~~~~~._~~~--1s 
0 1 000 2000 3000 
Horizontal Pressure (psf) 
Fig. 2 Various Distributions of Earth Pressure 
Table 2.-Ring Beams and Lagging Selected by Designer 
Depth Vertical Thick- Lagging 1 
Range, Spacing ness of Cover-
feet Steel of Beams Lagging age 
(metres) Section ft. (m.) in. (i:nn:i) min.% 
0-25 4 2 
(0-7.6) W24x55 (1.2) (50) 25 
25-57.5 4 3 
(7.6-17.5) W24x68 (1.2) {75) 50 
57.5-89.5 4 3 
_(17.5-27.3}_ W24x104 (1.2) .(75) 100 
The construction documents provided that the contract 
was to be responsible for ensuring that the soil conditio: 
were in accord with design assumptions and that the ril 
beams were adequately designed. The contract was let 011 
fast track basis because the city was under heavy pressure 
improve the quality of the effluent that it was pumping ba 
into the adjacent river. 
The contractor hired a structural engineer to exami 
the support system and subsequently increased the size 
the top group of ring beams to W24x62. 
CONSTRUCTION 
The contractor began construction in November with 
excavation about 11 feet (3.3 m) deep, without support, E 
constructed a concrete ring beam (Fig. 1). This beam wa 
feet deep (2m), 5 feet (1.5 m) wide at the top, and 3 feel 
m) wide at the bottom, with a vertical inner edge (Fig. 
Shaft lining began with lagging boards that were 12 fee1 
m) long. Steel ring beam number 2 was placed first. 11 
the upper ring (number 1) was placed and the upper lin 
backfilled. Normal downward shaft excavation then begE 
The ring beams arrived on site, precurved, with e 
representing l/15th of the circumference. The contrac 
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welded groups of three sections together on the ground 
surface and then lowered these units into position. Once the 
first sections were in place, excavation was carried out over 
the entire bottom to about one foot (0.3 m) below the 
bottom edge of the next ring beam. The excavation 
extended about one foot (0.3 m) outside the projected 
position of the outer edge of the next ring beam. The next 
section was then lowered into position and hung from the 
ring above using tie rods. The wood lagging was placed on 
the outside of the ring beams and temporarily supported 
from the steel by driving a nail into the lagging and bending 
it over the outer flange of a steel ring. Wood wedges and 
blocking were placed between the lagging and the natural 
ground to provide support. Straw was stuffed into the voids 
where water seeps were encountered. 
Actual soil conditions were different from those 
predicted from the single soil boring. A panoramic sketch 
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Fig. 3 Panoramic Sketch of the Excavation 
On the east side there was about 13 feet (4 m) of clay, then 
10 feet (3 m.) of sandy clay, and then 17 feet (5 m) of clean 
sand. 
On the west side of the excavation, an apparent buried 
erosional surface cut down through the sandy clay and clean 
sand and into the underlying claystone. Overlying the 
erosional surface in the claystone was a layer of sand and 
gravel in tum overlain by mixed clay, silt, sand, and gravel. 
Above about 33 feet (10m) depth, the "buried channel" was 
filled with the clay soils present at shallower depth around 
the entire excavation. 
Raveling and small caveins occurred on the north and 
east sides early in December, apparently in the clean sand, 
which dried rapidly when exposed. The contractor us~d 
3x6-inch (75 x 150 mm) wood cribbing and hay to backftll 
the voids initially. Several larger openings were filled with 
cement grout. Except for these problems, the project 
proceeded on schedule through the top forty feet (12m). 
801 
On the west side of the excavation, when down to about 
ring beam 8, a fire, caused by welding activities, developed 
in the hay backfill, and forced the replacement of lagging 
from beams 3 and 6. The firemen used substantial amounts 
of water in fighting the fire. The new lagging was wedged 
into place as before but no special efforts were made to 
replace soil that may have been softened. 
FAILURE 
In early December, during the middle and end of the week 
of the failure, there were substantial rains in the area. On 
Monday, a block of soil, described as 3x4x4 feet (lxl.2xl.2 
m), slid into the excavation on the west side, in the area of 
rib 9, apparently without causing concern on the part of 
anyone. It appears that routine hay and wood backfill 
operations were performed and work continued. 
On Thursday evening, at about 5PM, workers were 
placing ring 11 at a depth just above the interface between 
the soils and the claystone. On the west side, water was 
flowing into the excavation through the lower gravel 
"channel filling" and two cavities were noted behind the 
rings and lagging. The contractor tried to use hay and 
timber cribbing to fill the cavities but the holes continued to 
enlarge. The construction superintendent for the day shift, 
which ended at 3PM, testified that the main void was about 
4 feet (1.2 m) wide, 2 feet (0.7 m) deep, and 12 feet (3.7 m) 
high early in the day but had widened to about 12-15 feet (4 
to 5 m) by the end of his shift. He was not concerned about 
the void although they were in the process of trying to stop 
its expansion. By about 9:30PM, the two voids had merged 
into one void along the gravel/claystone interface with a 
horizontal dimension along the circumference of the 
excavation estimated to be 50 feet (15 m), a maximum 
height of about 12 to 15 feet (4-5 m), and a radial 
dimension of about 5 feet (1.5 m). Workers changed tactics 
and welded some 2x2 (50x50 mm) steel angles to the outside 
of rings 8 through 10 and tried to construct angle iron 
bracing projecting into the void between the ring beams and 
the soil, upon which to support timber cribbing and hay 
filling of the void. 
At about 12:30 AM, workers standing in the bucket of a 
front end loader, well up in the air, and working on the 
cribbing system, observed that they, and the loader, were 
slowly being pushed back toward the center of the 
excavation. They also heard loud popping noises and what 
sounded like an explosion in the general vicinity of ring 
beam 5. 
All workers were removed from the excavation. The 
support system on the west side began to collapse (Fig. 1). 
The failure progressed downwards, and the entire west side 
of the support system had failed by 3:30AM. Over the next 
few days, the entire support system unraveled and collapsed 
into the excavation as a twisted pile of steel (Fig. 4 ). 
Eyewitness accounts and the locations of the steel rings 
immediately after the initial stages of the failure, indicate 
that the failure involved an inward buckling of rings 
starting with ring #5 at the top. 
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Fig. 4 Photograph of Collapsed Support System on the 
WestSide 
The time sequence of initial failure movements of rings 
is uncertain because the evidence was obliterated by 
movements in later stages of the failure. 
POST MORTEM BY THE DESIGNER AND 
STRUCTURAL CONSULTANTS 
Subsequent to the failure, the contractor filed a claim for 
changed conditions on the basis that the thick sand layer on 
the east side had not been shown in construction documents, 
nor had the thick gravel seam in the "buried channel" on the 
west side. The design engineer rejected the claim, pointing 
out that the contractor was responsible for ensuring the 
accuracy of the soil profile and performing the structural 
design. Further, the design engineer claimed that the 
contractor should have been able to stabilize the cavein 
more quickly. 
A structural engineer, representing the designer, rejected 
eyewitness accounts of inwards movements of upper beams 
and concluded that the beams buckled outwards. He also 
argued that ring #5 did not bear properly on the blockout 
and was thus subjected to a twist for which it had not been 
designed. A structural engineer representing the contractor 
testified that the rings were unsafe for buckling failure. 
SUBSEQUENT SITE INVESTIGATIONS 
Site Visits 
The first author visited the site on the following Monday 
afternoon (about 70 hours after the failure began) and on a 
number of other occasions during the next month. At the 
time of the first visit, water was flowing into the excavation 
through the debris on the west side. Soil samples were 
taken and field conditions were photographed. Much of the 
site, including the failure zone, was inaccessible. 
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Laboratory Tests 
During the early phases of the investigation it was believed 
that there may have been an earth pressure problem in the 
cohesive soils at shallow depths and that this problem may 
have led to buckling of the beams. Accordingly, hand 
carved samples of some of the shallow soils were obtained 
and one each, drained and undrained, stage-type triaxial 
compression tests were performed. The failure envelopes 
had the following intercepts and slopes: 
undrained: 
drained: 
c = 900 psf = 43 kPa ~=19 deg. 
c = 150 psf = 11 kPa i= 27 deg. 
The finite value of ~ for the undrained tests makes it 
clear that the samples were not saturated. No Atterberg 
limit tests were performed on the specific samples used for 
triaxial tests. However, numerous tests with adjacertt 
samples showed that LL ranged from 31 to 38%, PI from 
16 to 24%, water contents from 16 to 24%, with one sample 
classified as ML and the others as CL. The sand/silt/clay 
fractions were generally about 15/55130 %. 
Failure Area 
Attempts by the first author to investigate conditions in the 
failure zone, several days after the failure, were only 
partially successful because the lower rings were buried in 
debris and the upper soils had slid down over the soils that 
were adjacent to the excavation in the failure zone. 
However, during reconstruction, the steel and some of 
the soil debris was removed, and it was possible to access 
part of the west side where the failure apparently began. In 
that area, the top forty feet (12 m) (estimated depth) was 
cohesive but the top ten feet (3 m) (estimated) of supposed 
claystone was actually a mixture of soils ranging from clay 
to gravel. A sketch of the zone where failure was believed 
to have begun is shown in Fig. 5. The "red bed" was a red, 
highly plastic clay, with LL=72%, and PI=50%. Water was 
still flowing out of the lower gravel layer a month after the 
failure. The gravel layers may have been channel deposit! 
with high pore water pressures resulting from exposure oi 
the gravel at a higher elevation off site. 
Fig. 5 Sketch of Exposed Soil in the Area of th' 
Failure (Section about 35 feet=ll m wid' 
and 15 feet=4.5 m high) 
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Earth Pressure Computations 
For confining pressures approximating those in the field, 
the triaxial samples failed at low axial strains (1% 
undrained to 4% drained). In consideration of the 
construction method, which left significant thicknesses of 
soil unsupported before installation of the rings and lagging, 
and the large diameter-to-depth ratio at the time of failure, 
it is believed that earth pressures may be closer to classical 
Rankine values rather than those appropriate for 
prestressed, braced, or tied back, excavations. 
A Rankine-type analysis was performed for active earth 
pressures using the soil profile assumed by the design 
engineer. Under undrained conditions, using the failure 
envelope reported earlier, and a total unit weight of 120 pcf 
(18.8 kNfm3) the earth pressure would be as shown by 
curve 1 in Fig. 2 (no pressure to a depth of 21 feet (6.4 m) 
and the pressure at a depth of 42 feet (12.8 m) would be 
about 1280 psf (61.3 kPa). Vertical scarps of the order of 
this height were observed in the clays on the west side 
during the early stages of the clean up so the computations 
appear realistic. 
Under drained conditions, the earth pressure depends on 
the assumed water conditions above the water table. If the 
water table is set at a depth of 42 feet (12.8 m) at the top of 
the claystone, and the water pressures above the water table 
are zero, then curve 2 (Fig. 2) is calculated, with a free 
standing height of only 4 feet (1.2 m) and an earth pressure 
of 1210 psf 57.9 kPa) at 42 feet (12.8 m). 
If the pore water pressures above the water table are the 
no-flow negative values, then curve 3 (Fig. 2) is obtained. 
There is no earth pressure down to 22 feet (6.6 m) and the 
earth pressure is 1710 psf (81.9 kPa) at 42 feet (12.8 m). 
Analyses under drained conditions for the actual soil 
profile on the west side are shown as curve 4 in Fig. 2. 
Soil conditions at the time of the failure are unclear. 
Although it had rained periodically for the preceding six 
days, some eyewitnesses claimed to see dust blown into the 
air during parts of the collapse. 
A comparison of the earth pressures diagrams suggests 
that the pressures :used by the design enginee~ were 
reasonable and conservative and that problems wtth the 
earth pressure computations was not the cause of the failure. 
ANALYSES OF RING BEAM DESIGN 
According to conventional design procedures, the steel 
ring beams must have adequate capacity to support ~e 
external soil pressures while acting as pure compress10n 
members. The design condition is given by: 
T=p Rs =fsA (1) 
where T=compression thrust in the ring, p=design soil 
pressure, R=radius of excavation, s=ring spacing ( 4 feet = 
803 
1.2 m here), fs=allowable steel stress, and A is the ring 
cross sectional area. If blocking space is not very close, a 
different analysis may be used which accounts for the 
bending moments induced in the curved rin~ between 
blocking points. Calculations suggest that the nng beams 
(Table 2) have adequate capacity to support the "Pressure 
used in Design" shown in Fig. 2. 
Complete buckling failure and collapse of the 
underground support systems is uncommon, and generally 
not well understood by the profession. Two different 
structural consultants argued, after the failure, that the ring 
beams were inadequate because they did not have adequate 
capacity according to a buckling equation of the form: 
3EI 
Per= R3 (2) 
where Per=critical external pressure on the support system, 
at which failure occurs, E and I are the lining material and 
sectional properties, and R=radius as before. 
An equation of the form of Eq. 2 is not applicable in the 
present case, nor is it applicable to most conditions in 
underground construction. This equation is based on the 
assumption that the support is subjected to a uniform 
external fluid pressure. Failures of steel casings in slurry-
filled holes, or surrounded by fluid grout, have occurred as 
predicted by this equation, or by similar equations which 
account for initial out-of-roundness of the cylinder due to 
manufacturing tolerances. 
These boundary conditions do not apply to underground 
linings which are in contact with the surrounding soil (or 
rock) around their entire perimeter. Such linings include 
shaft and tunnel ring beams or continuous shells (steel pipe, 
steel liner plate, thin concrete or shotcrete shells) which are 
well blocked or grouted in place. Total collapse of such 
linings, by buckling failure, is rare because of soil-structure 
interaction effects. Whenever an inward deforming bulge 
begins to form in the lining, due to external soil pressure, 
arching tends to develop in the soil to relieve the driving 
pressure. Simultaneously, adjacent outward bulges of the 
lining induce passive soil p'ressures which tend to restrain 
further movement. 
Accordingly, buried cylinders, properly installed, have 
much higher buckling strength than defined by the fluid 
buckling case of Eq. 2. Buckling equations of forms such as 
the following (Allgood, 1972) are applicable to most 
underground cases: 
Per= C ~ Es(~~) (3) 
where c is a parameter determined by boundary conditions 
such as depth of burial and Poisson's· ratio of soil and lining 
materials, Es=deformation modulus of the soil, E and I are 
as defined before, D=2R=diameter of the excavation. 
Boulson (1985) summarized the theoretical basis of 
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buckling strength of underground structures, and various 
analytical and experimental studies which have been made. 
Note that the controlling parameter of the lining is the ring 
stiffness EI!R3 or EIJD3. Bucking failures of underground 
support systems can generally occur only in unusual 
conditions, such as extremely loose soils which permit large 
lining deformations (diametral deformations in the range of 
15% to 20% can be tolerated before snap-through buckling 
failure in the first mode), highly concentrated loadings, or 
unusually low ring stiffness of the support or lining. 
Although the ring stiffness of the W24x68 ring beams for 
this case, about their strong (x-x) axis, is relatively low, 
about EI/03=0.42 psi (2.9 kPa), the second author has 
reported successful use of linings with ring stiffnesses as 
low as EI!D3=0.05 psi (0.35 kPa) in shafts of approximately 
the same dimensions as this case (Heuer et al., 1983). 
Hence, the problem here was not simply use of a lining 
outside of previous experience. 
The buckling strength of ring beam support systems, as 
defined by equations such as Eq. 3, is based on fundamental 
assumptions about construction methods and structural 
details. These are: 
a. The lining is assumed tc;> be in relatively continuous 
ccmtact with the surrounding ground around the entire 
perimeter, and 
b. The ring beams are restrained and supported such that 
they do not twist or buckle about their weak (Y-Y) axis. 
Construction methods must ensure that these conditions are 
satisfied. For linings of low ring stiffness, assumption "a" 
is best satisfied by grouting the annulus between lining and 
excavate~ structure. It may possibly be satisfied by well 
developed wood blocking and wedging in relatively stable 
soils. Assumption "b" is normally satisfied by supporting 
the ring beams partially by the tie rods and partially by 
friction between soil and the ring system. Soil pressure is 
normally essentially horizontal against the lining, because 
soil weight is supported by the continuous column of 
confined soil outside the lining. 
Both of these conditions were violated when the large 
void developed outside the west side of the shaft in the 
hours before the failure. 
EXPLANATION OF THE FAILURE 
Conditions which existed on the west side of the shaft 
just before failure were approximately as shown in Fig. 6. 
There had been one or more voids on the west side for 
several days. Water was apparently flowing from the 
gravel layers into the excavation, eroding soil which was 
then being removed by the front end loaders as if it were 
soil from the bottom of the excavation. Routine efforts to 
support the cavities had not been successful. In the gravel, 
the flow of water rapidly enlarged the cavities to the point 
that use of hay and wood cribbing was inadequate. Soil 
contact outside rings 7 through 10 had been lost for several 
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Fig. 6 Conditions In the West Wall at the Time of Failure 
These rings may have deformed outwards sufficiently to 
relieve the load they were carrying. This movement was 
not observed, perhaps because the deformation was small, 
occurred over a substantial length, and no plastic hinge 
formed. The earth pressure that was originally carried by 
rings 7 through 10 must have been transferred through 
arching, partially into the floor of the excavation, and 
partially into the above ring beams. 
Accurate calculation of the loads in the upper remainin~ 
ring beams is not possible due to lack of information 
Various estimates of the loads can, however, be made. Fo1 
example, if the soils are all assumed to be drained with l 
pore water pressure of zero above the water table, and l 
Rankine active condition is assumed, then the ring thrus 
loads would be about as shown in Fig. 7. It might b< 
assumed that loads in rings 9 and 10 would be arched int< 
the unexcavated "rock" beneath the excavation. The load 
in rings 7 and 8 can be assumed to be arched into uppe 
rings. If loads in rings 7 and 8 are distributed to rings ' 
through 6, the possible ring loads might be as shown in Fig 
7. Peak ring loads would be in the range of 350 to 400 kip 
(1.5 to 1.8 MN). 
However, use of Eq. 3 indicates that the W24x6 
members in the failure area should have been adequate t 
support thrust loads of this magnitude. 
The growing void in the lower soils undercut th 
overlying clay soils. These upper soils would tend to settl 
downwards, creating downward drag on the lagging behin 
rings 5 and 6, as illustrated in Fig. 6. This downward so 
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Ring Force (kips) 
Possible Ring Beam Thrust Loads Before and 
After Void Formation 
movement may have been facilitated by overload and 
developing failure in ring 5 at the blackout (discussed 
below), which .led to i~creased loading and yielding of ring 
6 a~ we~l. _Soil softemng by water used to extinguish the 
earher fue m the hay may have contributed to downwards 
soils movements into the void. 
This vertical soil load, plus the weight of rings 5 through 
10, would have subjected the tie rods between rings 4 and 5 
to l~ads ~twe~n 10 a~d 20 tons (88~176 kN). Resulting 
tensiOn failure m the tie rods would allow the entire ring 
beam structure, from rings 5 to 10, to buckle downwards 
and into the excavation, buckling about the weak (Y-Y) 
axis. This scenario is in accord with observed positions of 
the members after the initial stages of the failure although 
the steel ~as s_o twisted after the large movements, and 
covered With so1l, that the detailed conditions at the moment 
of failure could not be ascertained. 
Some experts theorized that the failure was initiated 
because structura_l detailing at the blockout between rings 4 
and 6 led to the lme of thrust from the rings coming slightly 
to the inside of the center of the frame for the blackout, 
producing a twist in the side members of the blackout. The 
authors believe that the failure was initiated by load transfer 
from the lower rings because of the voids which formed 
outside the lower rings, and by downward drag of the soil. 
~~ct~ral detailing at the blackout may have led to failure 
mitlatmg at that particular location, rather than elsewhere 
but the basic cause of the failure was formation of void~ 
outside the lower rings. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
The engineers on the two sides of the litigation may not 
agree on the lessons learned. The view of the authors (who 




The minimal soils investigation may have resulted 
from fast tracking and economic constraints imposed 
by the owner. The owner's attempt to transfer the 
responsibility for an inadequate soils investigation to 
the contractor did not succeed because there was 
insufficient time for an additional soils investigation 
and because such additional investigations are not in 
accord with usual practice. 
Re~ponses fr~~ the design supervising engineer 
dunng a depos1t10n, led to the belief that the designer 
had performed the "design" in accord with their 
previous experience without giving much thought to 
altern.atives, to the relevance of their previous 
expenence, or to the consequences of having field 
conditions different from those assumed. Had the 
presence of clean sand and gravel been suspected, 
st~el sheeting and ring beams, or some other system 
with full surface support, could have been used in the 
upper soils and should have prevented the failure. 
3. The failure would not have occurred if the large 
voids outside the lining had not formed. Where 
granular soils were encountered, particularly with 
moderate seepage, the problem might have been 
avoided if a thick grout had been placed behind 
tightly placed wood lagging, or if liner plate had been 
installed and backgrouted, to fill any initial voids 
behind the support system. Short radial drains of 
slotted PVC pipe might have been placed at selected 
locations through the lining to permit controlled 
drainage of water without soil erosion, to prevent 
later formation of large voids. The site personnel 
seem not to have been aware of the potential serious 
consequences of such voids and did not take the 
necessary steps to control the problem at an 
appropriate time. 
4. As occurs so often, this failure resulted because 
details of the design and construction process were 
not adequate for the ground conditions actually 
encountered. 
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